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THE MOST IMPORTANT RIGHT WE
THINK WE HAVE BUT DON'T:
FREEDOM FROM RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION
Kenneth L. Marcus*
Few civil rights are more central than our freedom from religious discrimi-
nation. By this I mean not only the free exercise of religion and the freedom
from an established church protected under the First Amendment, but also the
freedom from discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation protected
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress
recognized the fundamental importance of this latter right in 1964, when it
acted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or
religion in programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance,
including both public and private post-secondary institutions. The way the
President and Congress acted to overcome our nation's legacy of religious dis-
crimination, like our tragic legacy of racial and ethnic discrimination, is one of
the great stories of America's Second Reconstruction.
We know this, as we know the basic protections that we as Americans
have from invidious discrimination. The growing litany of grounds on which
we and our children may not be discriminated grows with each generation, but
the first and fundamental protections established during the Civil Rights Era
were the freedoms from discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, and religion. Under the leadership of President Johnson, Congress
acted decisively in 1964 to ensure that federal funds would not be used to
support religious discrimination in America's schools. If only this were true.
How could this not be true? Senator Sam Ervin explained at the time that
"the discrimination condemned by [Title VI] occurs ... when an individual is
treated unequally or unfairly because of his ... religion . . . .'" The Supreme
Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago that, "victims of discrimina-
tion on the basis of... religion.., have had private Title VI remedies available
... since 1965 ... ,"2 Over the years, court after court has recognized that
* Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. The author was previously delegated
the authority of Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights and, before that, served in
the function of Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity. The essay has benefited from helpful comments from Eugene Volokh,
as well as from research conducted by Eric DaLeo and John Blakeley. The views presented
here are the author's alone, however, and may not reflect the position of any agency with
which the author has been associated.
1 110 CONG. REC. 5612 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1964), quoted by Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 338 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
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Title VI prohibits religious discrimination together with discrimination on the
basis of race, color, and national origin.' The courts have made this point
repeatedly, if casually, in the course of addressing other matters. Typically
they have referred to the Title VI prohibition on religious discrimination in the
course of surveying the pantheon of anti-discrimination protections. The courts
have not been alone in this. President Clinton recalled in an executive order
that "discrimination on the basis of ... religion ... [is prohibited under] Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act[ ] of 1964 ... ."' They said this. But it is not true.
In fact, Title VI prohibited discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or
national origin," but not on the basis of religion.5 This set of prohibited classi-
fications was subsequently expanded by legislation banning animus based on
sex, disability, or age.6 The list was even recently expanded to include mem-
bership in the Boy Scouts and other patriotic youth organizations.7 But relig-
ious discrimination in federally assisted activities, such as universities and
public schools, was never statutorily barred, despite the false memories that
appear to litter our collective constitutional unconscious. There are of course
prohibitions on some aspects of religious discrimination under such authorities
as the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Access
Act;8 in some state laws and local ordinances;9 and in the standards of some
post-secondary accreditation agencies."0 Yet it is still the case that no statute
bars federal funding of institutions that discriminate against students on the
basis of their religious affiliation in a manner akin to the statutes prohibiting
race and sex discrimination. Moreover, while the right has theoretically been
established under the Equal Protection Clause (at least with respect to public
institutions), no administrative agency is authorized to enforce its violation, and
a court reviewing the claim post-Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith would likely decide it under a rational basis
I See cases cited in Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2007). Susan
Tuchman first informed me of the numerous authorities for the proposition that Title VI
prohibits religious discrimination.
4 Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 27, 2000) (Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Race, Sex, Color, National Origin, Disability, Religion, Age, Sexual Orientation,
and Status as a Parent in Federally Conducted Education and Training Programs).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Specifically, Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
6 See Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000)
(sex); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (disability);
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000) (disabil-
ity); the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2000) (age).
7 20 U.S.C.A. § 7905 (West 2006) (the Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act).
8 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act, 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5001
(West 2006) (first enacted as P.L. 776, July 17, 1961), available at http://www.maec.org/ pa/
edopact.html.
Io See, e.g., American Bar Association, Standards for Approval of Law Schools: 2005-
2006, Standard 211 at 16-17 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/
2005-2006standardsbook.pdf.
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standard.'' In other words, while players of Little League Baseball are
extended federal administratively-enforced civil rights protections in public
schools,' 2 Muslims, Hindus, and Christians are not.
So what do we make of the numerous authorities who have said that Title
VI does prohibit religious discrimination? Were they simply mistaken? Did
they not know that Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams and activities only on the basis of "race, color, or national origin" and
not on the basis of religion?' 3 Was it a simple slip of the pen? If so, then why
has the pen slipped so frequently in this regard? Do these frequent slips indi-
cate something deeper about the forgotten absence of religion from among the
Title VI pantheon? Is it enough simply to point out that so many other civil
rights statutes prohibit religious discrimination, together with discrimination on
these other bases? And does this dispel the confusion or does it only highlight
the oddity of the omission? This short Essay will explore these questions and
argue that Congress' deletion of religion from the legislation that became Title
VI created a significant gap in the structure of both the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("1964 Act"), and, more generally, the federal system of civil rights
enforcement that cries out for legislative correction.
It is well known that Congress' core concern in enacting the 1964 Act was
not to ameliorate discrimination generally in all of its manifestations, but very
specifically to relieve the plight of African Americans." Since Congress' pri-
mary concern was black-white relationships, its long deliberations shed little
light on matters of religious discrimination,' 5 just as they cast little light on
matters of national origin.' 6 Congress' over-arching goal in passing Title VI
was, however, quite clear. Congress' intent was to prevent federal agencies,
such as the Department of Education, from funding programs that discriminate
against certain students on grounds that violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.' 7  In this respect, Congress was working to finish up business
left over from the First Reconstruction.
Title VI achieves this goal through a tripartite enforcement system: pri-
vate party litigation in the federal courts; Justice Department intervention in
certain matters of particular public import, such as cases evincing a pattern and
practice of discrimination; and administrative enforcement through civil rights
enforcement agencies within departments of the federal government. These
mechanisms, developed in the so-called Second Reconstruction, provided the
1 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(applying a rational basis test in Smith to hold that members of the Native American Church
were not constitutionally entitled to ingest peyote in the face of a generally applicable Ore-
gon law forbidding its use).
12 See The Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7905 (West 2006).
1' Under Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2000)), no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity" covered by Title VI.
"' See, e.g., Juan Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrim-
ination Under Title VII, 35 WM & MARY L. REV. 805, 806 (1994).
15 See Marcus, supra note 4.
16 Perea, supra note 15, at 817-21.
1' Marcus, supra note 4; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286-87.
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practical means of enforcing First Reconstruction-era rights that were otherwise
left unfulfilled. The intent of this legislation was to ensure that the rights cre-
ated in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment would not be violated, with
federal assistance, in programs and activities such as schools and colleges.
But the fact is that Title VI does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
religion, even though the 1964 Act elsewhere prohibits religious discrimination
in other contexts.18 It appears that Congress stripped religious discrimination
from Title VI because certain key members wanted to preserve the ability of
religiously affiliated colleges to discriminate in favor of co-religionists in
admissions and extra-curricular activities such as choir.19 The original version
of the bill that would become Title VI, drafted by the Department of Justice,
actually banned religious discrimination in federally assisted programs or activ-
ities, together with a handful of other prohibited classifications."0 The 1964
Act's House sponsor, Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler,
explained during floor debate that he wanted to permit denominational colleges
to engage in certain forms of discrimination in favor of co-religionists.2 ' Celler
stated that he was trying to "avoid a good many problems" relating to funding
that "goes to sectarian schools and universities. '"2 He elaborated that "for
these reasons, the subcommittee and, I am sure, the full committee or the
majority thereof deemed it wise and proper and expedient - and I emphasize
the work 'expedient' - to omit the word 'religion."' 23 It was in this way that
religious protection was shorn from Title VI.
If it is so clear that that Congress deliberately omitted religion from Title
VI, then why have so many authorities gotten it wrong? Was Celler's grim
deed repressed like a trauma to our constitutional psyche? To start with, it
must be acknowledged that every one of the erroneous references appears in
dicta, unaccompanied by any reasoning or analysis, and appears to be a simple
misstatement unconnected to the Court's holding. In each case, the term "relig-
ion" appears within a boilerplate catalog of discriminatory classifications. Sen-
ator Ervin's error may be due to the bill's evolution. The courts' errors may be
similarly understandable in light of the inclusion of religion in so many other
antidiscrimination authorities. On the other hand, the shear frequency with
which the courts have made this same error may suggest a deeper point; the
exclusion of religion from the list of prohibited bases of discrimination is
counterintuitive because it does not sit well with the text of the statute taken as
a whole, with the structure of federal civil rights law, or with congressional
intent to prevent government funding of unconstitutional discrimination.
Religion was nearly always what one might call a "usual suspect" classifi-
cation in antidiscrimination efforts before the 1964 Act, elsewhere in the 1964
8 The 1964 Act prohibits religious discrimination most prominently, of course, in Title VII.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
19 See generally Marcus, supra note 4.
20 110 CONG. REc. 2462 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1964).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Celler also alluded to other rationales for the omission, but they are less than
persuasive.
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Act, and subsequent to the 1964 Act.24 For example, in 1941, President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting discrimination in the
federal government and in the defense industry on grounds of "race, creed,
color, or national origin."2 5 In 1948, President Harry S. Truman proposed leg-
islation to prohibit federal employment discrimination or unequal treatment in
the military on grounds of "race, color, religion, or national origin."2 6 The
Civil Rights Act of 1957 established the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to
investigate discrimination on the basis of "color, race, religion, or national ori-
gin" in voting and elsewhere.2 7 In 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower pro-
posed legislation to strengthen voting rights, announcing to Congress that
individuals are entitled to equal protection regardless of "race, religion, or
national origin."'28 As previously noted, the legislation that evolved into the
1964 Act included numerous prohibitions on religious discrimination. Subse-
quent legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1968, added "sex" but contin-
ued to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' 9 In sum, freedom from discrimination based on "religion" or
"creed" has been a central, protected, civil right throughout the entire modem
era.
The jagged hole created when Congress ripped religion from Title VI is
rather stark. Consider this: the 1964 Act prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment, but not, generally, in education, although no evidence suggests that relig-
ious discrimination was either less prevalent or less harmful in schools than in
the workplace. In education, the 1964 Act provides, anomalously, two mecha-
nisms that address religious discrimination. First, the Attorney General is
given some, limited authorization to sue public colleges that deny admission on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in a way that limits
educational desegregation.3 ° This provision was obviously intended to pro-
mote post-secondary racial desegregation, not religious desegregation, and the
inclusion of religion in this provision was likely a rote recitation of the usual
suspect classifications.
Second, the Attorney General is authorized to intervene in certain pending
Equal Protection litigation claiming discrimination "on account of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin" if the case is of sufficient public importance.3
In other words, the Justice Department may join in pending, high-profile, Four-
teenth Amendment religious discrimination cases, but may not institute actions
on its own (except in the theoretical case of religious segregation 32 ); and no
24 See generally Perea, supra note 15, at 810-17 (en passant).
25 Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943).
26 Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1943-1948); Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722
(1943-1948).
27 Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 104, 71 Stat. 634, 635 (1957).
28 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 947 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1970) (quoting President Eisenhower's Special Message to Congress, Feb. 5, 1960).
29 The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000), also known as the Fair
Housing Act.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(a) (2000).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (2000).
32 Religious segregation is not unknown in the history of American college campuses. For
example, Syracuse University housed Jews separately from Christian students at Syracuse
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federal agency is authorized to investigate run-of-the-mill religious discrimina-
tion cases at educational institutions or cases in which the victim has been
unable to secure private counsel. No rational legislator would provide students
with these, and only these, protections against religious discrimination. The
existence of these limited, anomalous protections merely highlights the signifi-
cance of the gap created by the omission of religion from Title VI. Indeed, the
discrepancy can only be explained as a rather ham-handed effort to cut from the
1964 Act any provision that appeared to threaten parochial education. The
irony is that a bit of deft draftsmanship could easily have shielded religiously
affiliated institutions from any risk that might otherwise have been entailed in
protecting students from religious discrimination.
Why is it important to correct this unnecessary omission, forty-one years
after the fact? First, it is necessary to effectuate the primary intent underlying
Title VI: to ensure that federal funds will not be used to support activities
prohibited under the Constitution. Religious discrimination is clearly prohib-
ited by the Fourteenth and, some might argue, also by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. As a basic matter of public policy, the federal government should not
fund activities banned under the Constitution. Second, religious discrimination
should be policed with particular zeal because it has a dual quality absent in
other forms of bigotry.33 As with the other forms of discrimination, religious
discrimination stigmatizes groups that have historically faced prejudice and
bigotry in this country. Moreover, religious discrimination burdens the exer-
cise of activities which our constitutional culture holds as having a particular
social value.3 4 Third, religious discrimination should be policed because it is
so closely interrelated with racial and ethnic discrimination that a religious
exception to our anti-discrimination rules otherwise allows religious discrimi-
nators to escape sanction when acting under the guise of religious bigotry. This
point has been demonstrated elsewhere in the context of jury selection.3 5 It is
no less true with respect to educational discrimination. Fourth, by banning eth-
nic discrimination without also banning religious discrimination, Title VI
anomalously extends greater protections to members of religious groups that
share ethnic or ancestral characteristics than to groups that do not.36 The issue
becomes harder, not easier, when it is observed that religious discrimination
has an obvious disparate impact on certain ethnic groups; e.g., discrimination
University from 1927 to 1931. Other universities provided separate dormitories for Jewish
students, and many fraternities barred Jews. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICA 84-86 (1994). On the other hand, no serious scholar would suggest that religious
segregation has been the most serious or most prevalent form of religious discrimination in
post-secondary education or that it is has been a significant issue in the last half century.
33 See generally, Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CI. L. REv.
1245 (1994).
31 See Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CAR-
Oozo L. REV. 1243 (2000).
35 Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Con-
stitutional?, 9 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 169-173 (2005).
36 See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (holding that the
prohibition on racial discrimination within the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applies to persons of
Jewish ancestry).
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motivated by anti-Jewish religious animus has a disparate impact on persons of
Jewish ethnic or ancestral heritage.
The cleanest and best solution to this legislative problem would be a legis-
lative fix: Congress should explicitly prohibit religious discrimination in feder-
ally funded educational programs and activities, including colleges and
universities, just as it prohibits racial, color, national origin, sex, age, and disa-
bility discrimination at these institutions.37 The core language could be
adapted directly from Title VI (thereby resting its justification on the relatively
firm Spending Clause foundation): "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of religion, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."38 The legislation would then provide an enforce-
ment structure for violations of the statute identical to the procedures provided
for violations of Title VI and Title IX.
It is significant that substantially the same legislative solution has now
been advanced in the law review literature as a solution to three quite distinct
problems: student-on-student religious harassment in public schools, 3 9 the fail-
ure of some universities to provide reasonable accommodations to religious
students,4" and campus anti-Semitism.4 In fact, each of these problems - and
more could be cited (e.g., anti-Christian viewpoint discrimination,
Islamophobia, etc.) - is simply a discrete manifestation of a broader problem,
to wit, Congress has not yet finished the job it began in 1964 of providing an
enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the basic civil rights estab-
lished in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and codified in the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The legislation could easily be drafted in a way that would address Con-
gress' core interest in permitting federally funded, denominationally affiliated,
educational institutions to discriminate in favor of co-religionists in admissions,
e.g.:
Nothing in this provision shall be construed to limit a recipient of federal financial
assistance which pursues a religious affiliation, mission or purpose from applying
policies of admission of students and employment of faculty and staff that directly
relate to this mission, affiliation or purpose, provided that the recipient does not
engage in any form of discrimination prohibited under [Title VI, Title IX, the Age
Discrimination Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act].
Language of this sort would protect both the right of religious institutions to
prefer co-religionists and the right of religious minorities to enjoy equal educa-
tional opportunities in all other institutions.
31 See Erica L. Keller, Note, I'm Telling! Who Cares?! Student-on-Student Religious Har-
assment in Public Schools, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 1071 (2004) (noting the anomaly that relig-
ious harassment is not specifically barred, while racial, color, age, sex, and disability
harassment are).
38 See id. at 1082-83; Joshua C. Weinberger, Comment, Religion and Sex in the Yale
Dorms: A Legislative Proposal Requiring Private Universities to Provide Religious Accom-
modations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 239 (1998).
31 See Keller, supra note 38.
40 See Weinberger, supra note 39.
41 Marcus, supra note 4.
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Alternatively, depending on legislative policy goals, statutory language
could be drawn that would provide a somewhat lesser degree of religious exer-
cise protection to recipient institutions but which would more vigorously guard
the rights of other students. One potential model for such language already
exists in a standard that the American Bar Association has issued for accredita-
tion of American Law Schools. The ABA sets forth its basic "Non-Discrimina-
tion and Equality of Opportunity" requirements in Standard 210(a), which
require that "[a] law school shall foster and maintain equality of opportunity in
legal education .. .without discrimination or segregation on ground of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or sexual orientation. 42 Those require-
ments are subject to a limited exception for religiously affiliated institutions
which could be more broadly applied to ameliorate congressional (and constitu-
tional) concerns: "This Standard does not prevent a law school from having a
religious affiliation or purpose and adopting and applying policies of admission
of students and employment of faculty and staff which directly relate to this
affiliation or purpose ....,-4' The ABA subjects this exception to various
conditions, such as prior notice to applicants and admitted students, and a
requirement that the institution not violate any other standard.' The ABA fur-
ther provides that Standard 210(a) "permits religious policies as to admission,
retention, and employment only to the extent that they are protected by the
United States Constitution" and that it "is administered as if the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution governs its application."45 All of this
simply demonstrates that the concerns expressed by Title VI's sponsors can be
addressed fairly easily, and with any desired stringency, using off-the-shelf leg-
islative draftsmanship that has already been applied in similar contexts.
As discussed above, some members of Congress also had other, related
concerns in omitting reference to "religion" from Title VI in 1964. For exam-
ple, one Member indicated a desire to enable choirs to exclude non-co-religion-
ists. 46 This interest raises a complicated set of constitutional issues. The
congressional interest in permitting choirs to discriminate in favor of co-reli-
gionists is an example of the larger question as to whether universities must
subsidize student groups that exclude potential members on the basis of relig-
ion - or, more broadly, whether discriminatory expressive associations have an
equal right to government subsidies under the First Amendment. There is some
authority for the proposition that universities that subsidize student groups must
not discriminate against groups (including but not limited to religious groups)
that adopt discriminatory criteria for the selection of members of officers.4 7
Others argue that discriminatory expressive associations do not have a right to
42 American Bar Association, Standards for Approval of Law Schools: 2005-2006, Stan-
dard 210(a) at 14 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2005-2006
standardsbook.pdf (emphasis added).
41 Id. at Standard 210(e), 14-15.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See generally, Marcus, supra note 4.
41 See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 7:171
Fall 2006] RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 179
obtain government subsidies and that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would support their efforts to do so.4 8
To the extent that the former view should prevail (or to the extent that it is
legislatively favored on policy grounds), this legislative proposal could be
adjusted to include an exclusion for religious organizations similar to the exclu-
sions found elsewhere in federal antidiscrimination law. For example, Title VII
exempts religious organizations from the ban on religious discrimination in
employment4 9 and Title IX exempts religious organizations with contrary relig-
ious tenets.5" If Congress should choose to accommodate religiously based
expressive student associations in this manner, it could include a legislative
exemption such as the following provision:
This title shall not apply to a religious student organization with respect to the selec-
tion of individuals of a particular religion to serve as members or officers of the
association, if the application of this title would not be consistent with the religious
tenets of such association, provided that the association may not discriminate in any
other manner provided herein.
This is similar to the proposed exemption discussed above that would allow
religious educational institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion in
admitting students.
This legislative language is also likely to avert any Establishment Clause
challenges that could otherwise, at least theoretically, face any new statute that
may require private actors to provide religious accommodations to persons of
faith. As Justice Kennedy has acknowledged, "[t]here is a point... at which
an accommodation may impose a burden on nonadherents so great that it
becomes an establishment."5 1 On the other hand, the Court has recently
affirmed religious exemptions to generally applicable rules on a case-by-case
basis, signaling its willingness to require religious accommodations in the face
of Establishment Clause objections.52 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to
ridicule the Establishment Clause argument against religious accommodation as
"the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception
for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions." 5 3
48 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1968 (2006).
'9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000) contains the following provision: "This subchapter [42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17] shall not apply to an employer with respect to ... a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
-0 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2000) provides that: "this section shall not apply to an educa-
tional institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this
subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization."
5' Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 725 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006)
(holding that application of the Controlled Substances Act to a religious group's sacramental
use of hoasca violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 notwithstanding the
government's Establishment Clause arguments); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
(holding that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which per-
mits to seek religious accommodations, does not violate the Establishment Clause).
11 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1223.
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Conforming this proposal to the 1964 Act insulates it from Establishment
Clause challenges to the same extent as the comparable discrimination protec-
tions contained in Title VI (and arguably more so than comparable protections
in Title VII or Title VIII, which contain absolute prohibitions rather than condi-
tions on government subsidies).54 The prohibitions on discrimination and har-
assment in these provisions are all potentially subject to constitutional
challenge, but their endurance, and long-standing judicial support, suggests a
likelihood that they would survive challenge.
America's relationship with religious discrimination has been as central to
its self-definition as any other challenge in its constitutional culture, excepting
only issues relating to the freedom of expression and the evils of racial discrim-
ination. This history has, however, been somewhat ambivalent, and its signifi-
cance has been explicated and addressed in an oddly partial manner. America's
status as a refuge from religious persecution has been a central aspect of our
national mythology as well as our national history. Yet religious discrimination
has been present on American shores from the outset,55 and has been prevalent
historically and to the present day.56 Few would deny that religious discrimi-
nation has played a critical role in many important junctures of our nation's
history, including the foundation of some of our states.5 7 Evidence of contin-
ued discrimination, including discrimination in our public schools has been
presented to Congress at critical junctures, including the period leading up to
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In today's schools and colleges, relig-
ious discrimination remains a pressing issue.58 This discrimination is not lim-
ited to the handful of issues that have released an avalanche of scholarship and
litigation, e.g., refusal to exempt religiously motivated conduct from generally
applicable rules or selectively denying benefits to religiously motivated view-
points.59 More basic in some ways, and more pressing, have been the plight of
4 The ramifications of this distinction are explored in Volokh, supra note 49.
5 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1422-24 (1990).
56 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947) (describing history of religious
discrimination); but see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508-09 (1997) (noting that
Congress had not developed a sufficient record of religious discrimination to support the
Religious Freedom Reformation Act).
11 McConnell, supra note 55.
58 See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM (2006), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/081506campusantibrief.pdf (recounting anti-Jewish discrimina-
tion); Marilyn Elias, USA's Muslims Under a Cloud, USA TODAY, Aug. 9, 2006 (updated
Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-
cover_x.htm (recounting anti-Muslim and anti-Sikh discrimination); COUNCIL ON AMERI-
CAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIrHTs IN THE UNITED STATES 12
(2006) (reporting 162 anti-Muslim acts in American schools in 2005), available at http://
www.cair.com/pdf/2006-CAIR-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf.
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